A Lexical-Constructional Model Account of Illocution

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Abstract

The present article is a contribution to the understanding of non-inferential illocutionary meaning production. The theoretical framework, which is compatible with constructionist approaches to language such as Goldberg's (1995, 2006) Construction Grammar, is the Lexical Constructional Model or LCM (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, 2008a; Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2009). In dealing with speech act meaning, the LCM has so far proposed the following meaning construction mechanisms: (i) *cued inferencing* based on the metonymic access of high-level situational models or speech act scenarios; (ii) *illocutionary constructions*, such as *Can You X, please?* for requests; (iii) *lexical descriptions*, which are the equivalent of classical performative predicates; (iv) *argument structure constructions*, like the *manipulative subjective-transitive construction* (e.g. *I want you out by lunchtime*). In the present article, we improve the existing proposal by exploring in what way the elements of speech act scenarios can be made part of lexical structure, thus enriching the description of lexical templates for speech act predicates (e.g. *order*, *beg*, *threaten*) on the basis of Pustejovsky's (1995) notion of *qualia* structure. In so doing, we show that such descriptions allow the analyst to account for the constraining factors on the syntactic behavior of speech act predicates in terms of lexical-constructional integration at the argument structure level (e.g. the use of a speech act predicate in the caused-motion construction). This account also allows us to study complementary ways of producing conventional speech act meaning through the use of other lexical and constructional resources such as the *to be to* construction for ordering and the constructional configuration *You Are Going To X* plus expressions of immediateness. The resulting account makes explicit links between lexical structure and high-level situational cognitive models. It also enhances the role of (non-inferential) lexical and constructional devices in conveying illocutionary meaning.

Keywords: Lexical-Constructional Model, cognitive models, illocutionary construction, speech acts, *qualia* structure

Resumen

Este artículo ofrece un análisis léxico-construccional de aquellos aspectos no inferenciales del funcionamiento de los actos de habla. El marco teórico desde el que se realiza el estudio es el *Modelo Léxico-Construccional* o *MLC* (Ruiz de Mendoza y Mairal, 2008a; Mairal y Ruiz de Mendoza, 2009), compatible en sus postulados fundamentales con otras propuestas construccionistas como la *Gramática de las Construcciones* de Goldberg (1995, 2006). En trabajos anteriores, el *MLC* ha propuesto varios mecanismos de construcción del significado ilocutivo: (i) *la activación inferencial pautada* (*cued inferencing*), basada en el acceso metonímico a modelos situacionales de alto nivel o escenarios ilocutivos; (ii) *construcciones ilocutivas*, como *Can You X, please?* para las peticiones; (iii) *descripciones léxicas*, que son el equivalente de los predicados performativos clásicos; (iv) *construcciones argumentales*, como la construcción subjetivo-transitiva manipulativa (e.j. *I want you out by lunchtime*). En el presente artículo proponemos una mejora substancial de estas propuestas iniciales mediante el estudio de los elementos de los escenarios ilocutivos que son susceptibles de formar parte de la estructura léxica. Con este fin realizamos un enriquecimiento de la descripción de las plantillas léxicas de los predicados ilocutivos (e.j. *order, beg, threaten*) mediante la noción de la estructura de *qualia* propuesta por Pustejovsky (1995). Las descripciones léxicas resultantes nos permiten explicar los factores que constriñen el funcionamiento sintáctico de los predicados ilocutivos mediante la integración léxico-construccional en el nivel de la estructura argumental (e.j. uso de un predicado ilocutivo con la construcción de movimiento causado). Las mismas descripciones léxicas nos permiten también explorar formas adicionales de creación de significado ilocutivo convencional mediante el uso de otros recursos léxicos y construccionales como las construcciones *to be to* o *You Are Going To X*, seguida de una expresión de inmediatez, para el acto de habla de ordenar.

La presente propuesta hace explícitas las conexiones existentes entre la estructura léxica y los modelos cognitivos situacionales de alto nivel. Asimismo, subraya el papel de los mecanismos léxicos y construccionales (no inferenciales) en la producción e interpretación del significado ilocutivo.

Palabras clave: Modelo Léxico-Construccional, modelos cognitivos, construcción ilocutiva, actos de habla, estructura de *qualia*

1.Introduction

Studies on illocution have generally been assigned to the realm of pragmatics (e.g. Austin 1962; Searle 1969, 1975). Speech acts were initially seen as highly dependent

on inferential processes for their interpretation and in fact the few attempts that were made to account for their conventional nature were largely unconvincing (Searle 1975; Morgan 1978). In the 80s the inferential accounts of speech acts were taken to a more radical position by scholars such as Leech (1983) and Sperber and Wilson (1995). It was claimed that the understanding of all speech acts (both direct and indirect) was a matter of sheer inferential activity. Discussion on the conventionalization, much less the full grammatical codification, of illocutionary meaning was either banned from accounts on illocution or restricted to very generic categories such as Sperber and Wilson's so-called *high-level explicatures* which were associated with the three main sentence types (i.e. declarative, imperative, interrogative, or, in relevance-theoretic terms, saying, telling, and asking). In much the same way, some contemporary functional accounts (e.g. Halliday, 1985; Dik, 1989) recognized the existence of a number of coded illocutionary values. For example, Halliday accounted in grammar for four basic speech functions of stating, offering, questioning, and commanding and Dik distinguished four basic universal speech act categories (statements, commands, questions and exclamations), which were coded in the grammar of most languages, and postulated grammatical mechanisms to derive further values from the more basic ones (see Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2009, and Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez, 2010, for critical reviews of both proposals). More recently, however, the development of Cognitive Linguistics and encyclopedic semantics –following especially seminal work by Lakoff (1987) and Langacker (1987, 1991, 1999)– has allowed semanticists to discuss illocution as the result of performing very specific cognitive operations supporting inferential schemas that apply to a specific kind of cognitive model called illocutionary scenarios (Panther and Thornburg 1988, 1999, 2004) or low-level situational models (Ruiz de Mendoza 2007). It has also supplied an increasing amount of evidence supporting the existence and functionality of conventional speech acts and so-called *illocutionary constructions*, i.e. linguistic configurations consisting of fixed and variable elements which are highly specialized to convey specific illocutionary values (Panther and Thornburg, 1998, 1999; Pérez Hernández, 2001, Pérez Hernández and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2002; Stefanowitsch, 2003; Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi, 2007; Brdar-Szabó, 2009). These studies give evidence that illocutionary force derivation is less context-dependent than has generally been assumed by pragmaticists.

Such insights into the constructional nature of speech acts have paved the way for the incorporation of illocution into a comprehensive usage-based meaning construction model of language called the *Lexical Constructional Model* or LCM (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007a, 2008a, 2008b, 2010; Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza 2009; cf. Butler 2009, for a critical overview). The LCM, which is heavily grounded in Cognitive Semantics (e.g. Lakoff 1987) and Cognitive Construction Grammar

(e.g. Goldberg 1995, 2006), is structured around four levels of description: level 1 accounts for lexical and constructional argument structure representations; level 2 handles representations based on low-level situational models; level 3 deals with (conventionalized) illocutionary constructions and with speech act meaning derived on the basis of the metonymic activation of high-level situational models; level 4 addresses the discourse aspects of the model, including discourse constructions and inferential activity based on high-level propositional models. One of the goals of the LCM is to account for the way elements from each level are integrated into one another and the way in which each level of description is incorporated into the next higher level. All this activity is regulated by a number of licensing factors and constraints that either allow or impede level-internal and level-external integration of representations, on the one hand, and the production of inferences, on the other hand.

The LCM seeks to achieve the highest possible degree of explanatory adequacy. For this reason, it avoids the unnecessary proliferation of analytical categories. As part of its research methodology, it relies on what proponents of the LCM call the *equipollence hypothesis*. This is a working assumption that leads the analyst to explore to what extent linguistic processes that have been attested in one domain of enquiry are also active in other domains. Several such processes have been found to be pervasive: one is constrained conceptual integration, which results in the construction of level-internal conceptual amalgams; another is level (or sub-level)-external subsumption processes consisting in the principled incorporation of lower-level structure into higher-level structure; a third one is metaphoric and metonymic activity, which underlies lexical-constructional subsumption operations and level-2 and level-3 inferential activity. For example, the (high-level) metaphor AN EXPERIENTIAL ACTION IS AN EFFECTUAL ACTION licenses the incorporation of the verb *laugh*, which is not a caused-motion verb, into the *caused-motion construction*, as defined by Goldberg (1995), in *The audience laughed the actor off the stage*. This metaphor allows us to see the goal of an action as if it were the object of caused motion (see Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, 2007b, 2008a, for details). The metonymy OBJECT FOR ACTION (Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez, 2001) underlies the use of a non-actional object in sentences such as *He began the beer* (i.e. 'He began drinking, canning, selling, distributing, etc., the beer'). Part-whole metonymies have also been shown to lie at the basis of some pragmatic inferences. For example, in the context of discussing one's holidays, *The beaches were too crowded* gives access to a larger mental scenario where the excess of people on the beaches can really bother some tourists.

In further application of the equipollence hypothesis, the present paper will discuss how the lexical component of the LCM can allow us to incorporate the relevant illocutionary information into the lexical entries for speech act verbs, thus

(i) making it unnecessary to postulate independent illocutionary scenarios (e.g. Panther and Thornburg, 1998) or high-level cognitive models (e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi, 2007) for the description of the corresponding speech act categories, and (ii) bridging the gap between the lexical, grammatical, and illocutionary levels of linguistic description. As a result, just as the lexical structure of verbal predicates is integrated into the argument structure constructions that are compatible with them, the knowledge included in the lexical description of speech act verbs, if it is exhaustive enough, may license the production of speech act constructions with varying degrees of codification, depending on the number of elements of the speech act category that are instantiated linguistically.

It will further be argued that the LCM provides solid grounds for a unified account of illocution where different levels of description may make use of similar conceptual structure and operational mechanisms whenever it is relevant to do so. In the case of illocution, as we will see in detail, the information included in the verbal predicates allows us to provide an explanation for both the level-1 argument constructions involving speech act verbs (Pérez Hernández, 2009) and also for the corresponding level-3 illocutionary constructions, which exploit other grammatical and lexical mechanisms different from speech act verbs to convey illocutionary meaning.

The layout of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we offer a brief account of the main postulates of the LCM. Section 3 is devoted to an exhaustive description of lexical templates in the LCM; we will show that they are well suited for capturing all the relevant illocutionary information to make fully explicit the connections between lexically-based (level 1) and constructionally or inferentially-grounded (level 3) speech act meaning. We will illustrate our discussion with a detailed description of the lexical template for the verbal predicate *order*. Then, section 4 examines level-1 argument-structure constructions involving this verbal predicate. Section 5 deals with level-3 speech act constructions for orders. Finally, we conclude by offering some suggestions for further research.

2. Theoretical preliminaries: basic postulates of the Lexical Constructional Model

The LCM, as designed by Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010) and Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza (2009), is a complex linguistic model that productively combines selected theoretical proposals from a variety of compatible functional, cognitivist and constructional approaches. Its various stages of development have been well documented in Butler (2009).

It provides a comprehensive and powerful description of meaning construction, including areas which have often been regarded as lying outside the scope of grammar (e.g. traditional implicature, illocutionary force, and discourse coherence). As mentioned in the previous section, the LCM features four different levels or modules of linguistic description. In addition, it distinguishes two major meaning construction mechanisms: *subsumption* and *cueing*. The former operates at the grammatical level and "it consists in the principled incorporation of lower levels of semantic structure (captured in the form of lexical and constructional templates) into higher levels of syntactically-oriented structure" (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2008b: 377). The latter deals with "inferences developed on the basis of the blueprint provided by the output of lexical and constructional integration at whatever level of representation" (Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2009: 167). These two mechanisms are in turn regulated by a set of *internal* and *external constraints*.

As recently noted by Butler (2009), one of the major strengths of the LCM lies in the richness of the lexical, pragmatic and discourse descriptions that it provides. In this article we determine the applicability of the LCM tools for meaning description in relation to the analysis of speech act predicates under the assumption that an exhaustive characterization of the latter (i) should include both semantic and pragmatic information, and (ii) could lead to a unified account of the workings of illocutionary constructions at both level 1 (i.e. constructions producing argument structure characterizations) and level 3 (i.e. constructions that account for highly conventionalized/codified illocutionary meaning) of the model. This research thus builds on previous work by Pérez Hernández (2001), Pérez and Ruiz de Mendoza (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007), on the one hand, who deal with the conventional and non-conventional dimensions of illocutionary meaning from a cognitive perspective, and on Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez (2010), who examine the illocutionary impact of some level-1 construction mechanisms as illustrated by instances of the manipulative subjective-transitive constructions (e.g. *I want you out by lunch time*), on the other hand.

The lexical formalisms within the LCM are both compatible with a meaning-syntax linking algorithm, and are also sensitive to pragmatic, semantic and discourse information that is often eluded in other grammatical models due to the difficulties involved in its formalization. More specifically, lexical representation in the LCM is effected by means of *lexical templates*, a notion which originates in the pioneering work of Van Valin and Wilkins (1993). As shall be shown below in detail, lexical templates are a development of the logical structures (LS) postulated in *Role and Reference Grammar* (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997; Van Valin, 2005) and integrate relevant elements from both decompositional and frame-based proposals. In their more recent design (Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2008a), they have evolved to

include Pustejovsky's (1995) *qualia* structure roles or subjective experience.

The basic representational format of a lexical template is as follows (Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2008a):

Predicate': [SEMANTIC MODULE<lexical functions>] [AKTIONSART MODULE<semantic primes>]

The *Aktionsart Module* includes the inventory of logical structures as developed in RRG with the proviso that the predicates used as part of the meaning definition are semantic primes (i.e. they cannot be further decomposed). Figure 1 illustrates each verb class and its corresponding logical structure:

Figure 1. Verb class and logical structure

VERB CLASS	LOGICAL STRUCTURE	EXAMPLE	INSTANTIATION OF LS
State	**predicate'** (x) or (x,y)	see	**see'** (x,y)
Activity	**do'** (x,[**predicate'** (x) or (x,y)]	run	**do'** (x, [**run'** (x)])
Achievement	INGR **predicate'** (x) or (x,y), or INGR **do'** (x, [**predicate'** (x) or (x,y)]	pop burst into tears	INGR **popped'** (x)
Semelfactive	SEML **predicate'** (x) or (x,y) SEML **do'** (x, [**predicate'** (x) or (x,y)]	glimpse, cough	SEML **see'** (x,y)
Accomplishment	BECOME **predicate'** (x) or (x,y), or BECOME **do'** (x, [**predicate'** (x) or (x,y)]	receive	BECOME **have'** (x,y)
Active accomplishment	**do'** (x, [**predicate**$_1$**'** (x, (y))] & BECOME **predicate**$_2$**'** (z,x) or (y)	drink	**do'** (x,[**drink'** (x,y)]) & BECOME **consumed'** (y)
Causative accomplishment	α CAUSES β where α, β are LS of any type	kill	[**do'** (x,∅] CAUSE [BECOME [**dead'** (y)]

In addition, the *Semantic Module* includes the semantic and pragmatic properties

of the predicates, represented by combinations of *lexical functions*, which have been borrowed and adapted from those used in Mel'cuk's *Explanatory and Combinatorial Lexicology* (*ELC*) (cf. Mel'cuk 1989; Mel'cuk, Clas, and Polguère 1995; Mel'cuk and Wanner 1996; Alonso Ramos 2002). In keeping with the overall aim of the LCM to make use of a typologically adequate descriptive and explanatory apparatus, lexical functions have a universal status.

The meaning of lexical functions is abstract and general and can produce a broad range of values. By way of illustration, consider the function **Magn**, which expresses intensification, when applied to the different lexical units in English and Spanish:

Magn (Engl. smoker) = heavy
Magn (Engl. bachelor) = confirmed
Magn (Sp. error 'mistake') = craso ('gross')
Magn (Sp. llorar 'cry') = llorar como una magdalena ('cry one's heart out')

3. The lexical template for *order*

In the domain of speech acts, the semantic and pragmatic idiosyncrasies of the predicate *order* are captured by the following lexical template:

order: <$MAGN_{1[PERM]\ 2}$, LOC $^{SOC}{}_{(1)}$ > **[do'** (x, **[say'** (x,y)])] CAUSE **[do'** (y, ø)] x= 1, y =2

The speaker and the addressee are codified by the external arguments or variables (x) and (y), which belong to the logical part of the template. These arguments are bound to corresponding internal variables (marked by the subscripts $_1$ and $_2$ respectively), each of which holds for one or more lexical functions within the semantic module of the template. The lexical function MAGN indicates that the illocutionary force of the action (say) is intensified to a high degree. The lexical template also captures the fact that the speaker has power over the addressee and is thus allowed to ask the addressee to do things, which is indicated by the function PERM that is applied to the first argument. Finally, it is further specified that such power originates in the higher social status of the speaker by means of the function LOC $^{SOC}{}_{(1)}$, where LOC suggests figurative location and SOC the high social position. To the information contained in the *Semantic Module*, the *Aktionsart Module* adds the semantic primitive **(say')**, the type of *Aktionsart*, i.e. a causative activity, and the number of arguments of the predicate. This semantic primitive defines the lexical domain of the verbal predicate under consideration. These primitives, inspired in

previous work within the *Functional-Lexematic Model* (FLM) (Martín Mingorance 1990, 1995; Faber and Mairal 1999) coincide to a large degree with those proposed by Wierzbicka (1972, 1996, 2002a, 2002b) in her *Natural Semantic Metalanguage* (NSM), which has proved to be valid for the description of over a hundred languages. In turn, from the *Aktionsart* perspective *order* designates an activity such that x says something to y and this causes y to act in the specified way.

As is evident from the example above, lexical templates provide rich semantic representations that go beyond those aspects of the meaning of a word that are grammatically relevant. In this sense, the semantic module of the lexical templates can be regarded as a sort of economic cognitive model capable of capturing relevant knowledge about a predicate.

More recently, the metalanguage for lexical templates has been revisited and further elaborated in Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza (2008a) in such a way that internal and external variables are unified within a system that allows the expression of both, at the same time that the notational devices are made compatible with computational requirements (Mairal and Periñán 2009). The latest version of the LCM lexical templates further represents an attempt to overcome the sometimes *ad hoc* ascription of a lexical function to a semantic parameter. With this view in mind, the following set of *qualia* from Pustejovsky's (1995) *generative lexicon* have been incorporated into the architecture of lexical templates in the LCM:

CONSTITUTIVE (Q_C): the relation between an object and its constituent parts
i. material
ii. weight
iii. parts and component elements

FORMAL (Q_F): that which distinguishes it within a larger domain
i. orientation
ii. magnitude
iii. shape
iv. dimensionality
v. color
vi. position

TELIC (Q_T): its purpose and function
i. purpose that an agent has in performing an act
ii. built-in function or aim which specifies certain activities

AGENTIVE (Q_A): factors involved in its origin or 'bringing it about'
i. creator
ii. artifact
iii. natural kind
iv. causal chain

The function of the *qualia* is to specify the particular semantic and pragmatic properties of each of the arguments involved in an event. Together with the *qualia* structure, Pustejovsky's generative lexicon includes three other levels of representation, namely, argument structure, event structure, and lexical inheritance structure, of which the event structure coincides to a large extent with the *Aktionsart module* in the LCM. The *qualia* (semantic) and eventive (*Aktionsart*) modules are closely intertwined, which enhances the semantics-to-syntax mapping possibilities of a predicate. As pointed out by Pustejovsky (1995: 101-104), individual *qualia* compete for projection, and there are mechanisms such as foregrounding or 'focalizing' a single *quale* of the verbal semantic representation. As shall be shown in the remainder of this paper, this has interesting consequences for metonymy-based inferential accounts of speech acts, thus paving the way both for more constrained and predictable illocutionary interpretations and, in some cases, for a full constructionist account of certain speech act formulations. The revised version of our previous lexical template for the verbal predicate *order* incorporates the *qualia* structure as follows:

Order:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = [\text{do' } (x, [\text{say' } (x,y)]_{e1})]_{E1}\ [\text{CAUSE } [\text{do' } (y, \varnothing)]_{e2}]_{E2,}\ E1{>}E2$$

$$\text{ARGSTR} = [\text{ARG1} = x\text{: animate\_ind}\ \text{FORMAL} = \text{human PERM}_2\ \text{LOC}^{\text{SOC}\uparrow_2}]$$

$$\text{ARG2} = y\text{: animate\_ind}\ \text{FORMAL} = \text{human LOC}^{\text{SOC}\downarrow_1}]$$

$$\text{QUALIASTR} = \{Q_F\text{: MANNER: Magn}_{e1}\ Q_A\text{: want' } (x, e_2)\ Q_T\text{: } e_2\text{: Bon}_x\ \text{Nocer}_y\}$$

The event structure encodes an activity in which the speaker's utterance causes the addressee to perform an action. The argument structure further specifies the semantic and pragmatic properties of each of the actors involved. Thus, both arguments require an animate human actor. In addition, as captured by the lexical functions $\text{PERM}_2\ \text{LOC}^{\text{SOC}}{}_2$, the first participant has power over the second due to his/her higher social status. The manner in which the initial causing activity should be carried out is specified in the Formal *Quale*: the intensifier lexical function Magn ('very', 'intense', 'forceful') restricts the semantics of this class to those directives

that exclude mitigation in their performance. *Orders* will, therefore, share this *quale* with other impositive directives such as *commands*, *threats*, etc. The Agentive *Quale* specifies a relevant motivating factor of *orders*: the speaker's desire that a certain subevent ($_{e2}$) takes place. This *quale* sets *orders* –and other semantically related illocutions such as *requesting* and *begging*– apart from other directives in which the speaker's interest in the materialization of the subevent $_{e2}$ is not essential for their characterization (e.g. *warning* and *advising*, among others). Finally the Telic *Quale* corresponds to the caused subevent, and the semantic and pragmatic implications that it bears for the actors involved. In the case of orders, the caused subevent ($_{e2}$) is further specified in order to account for the fact that it prototypically results in a benefit for the speaker and a cost for the addressee. The lexical functions Bon ('good for') and Nocer ('bad for'), applied to the first and second arguments respectively, capture this piece of pragmatic knowledge which rounds up the semantic build-up of the predicate *order*.

4. Level-1 argument structure constructions involving speech act verbs

As shown in section 2, the recent incorporation of *qualia* structure into the LCM lexical templates turns them into rich predicate frames, which combine (encyclopedic) semantic, pragmatic, and logical variables that are linked to one another in readiness for syntactic realization. This section deals with such realization at the level of argument structure constructions, and it looks into the compatibility of the predicate *order* with a number of grammatical constructions, more specifically the caused-motion, resultative, and *way*-constructions, all of which we will described below. We will specify the conditions for the lexical template for *order* to be subsumed into the constructions under consideration. In the LCM, the representation of constructional templates makes use of the same metalanguage as lexical templates. As a result, the integration of lexical templates into constructional templates –also referred to as the *lexical-constructional subsumption process*– becomes a straightforward task. The discussion below will also provide some evidence of the explanatory potential of the LCM lexical templates. In this connection, the semantic and pragmatic information incorporated in their *qualia* structure will be shown to have the potential of either licensing or blocking the unification of the predicate *order* with each particular grammatical construction.

Consider the following instances of the predicate *order:*

(1)
[...] the Lt Col then *ordered* him to contact the duty military police. (From <

http://www.herald.ie/national-news/i-was-ordered-to-carry-away-safe-pilot-tells-court-martial-2198683.html> Accessed on May 29, 2010)

(2)
I instantly *ordered her out of* the room.

(From < http://chestofbooks.com/novel/The-Woman-in-White-Wilkie-Collins/The-Story-Continued-By-Mrs-Catherick-Part-4.html> Accessed on May 29, 2010)

(3)
Mandela *ordered troops into* Lesotho in September 1998. (From < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nelson_Mandela> Accessed on May 29, 2010)

(4)
The Bolivian army *ordered him dead*.

(From < http://lajauretsi.wordpress.com/2008/11/25/benicio-as-che/> Accessed on May 29, 2010)

(5)
[...] the District Attorney's office *ordered Barnes arrested* for murder.

(From <http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20100524_Barnes_jury_to_resume_deliberations_today.html > Accessed on May 29, 2010)

(6)
*He *ordered his way into* the room.

(7)
*I *ordered my way into* the army.

Sentence (1) is a straightforward syntactic realization of the lexical template for *order* that makes use of the *object + infinitive* construction. But, as illustrated by examples (2), (3), (4) and (5), the verb *order* can also take part in other constructions, like two related forms of the manipulative subjective-transitive, which are but special cases of the caused-motion construction, as in (2) and (3), and of the resultative construction, as in (4) and (5), where either the changed destination or the changed state is not presupposed but only expected. In order to be part of these other constructions, however, the verbal predicate needs to undergo a process of subsumption, which accounts for the necessary changes in its original argument structure. However, *order* does not fare well with other related constructions such as the so-called *way* construction (cf. Levin 1993), which is but a partially idiomatic case of the caused-motion construction where the fixed element *way* (together with its accompanying possessive) has the role of figurative object of motion (e.g. 6 and

7). In this construction, clearing one's path so as to have access to a place is seen as if the path were an object that is possessed by the protagonist of self-instigated motion. Forcing the possessed path to move into a given location maps onto creating a pathway into the location. This figurative construal of the 'having access to a place' is but a special case of what Talmy (2000) has discussed in detail under the label of *fictive motion*, that is, motion that does not actually take place, but that arises from the way our visual perception mechanisms proceed when processing real or imposed paths (e.g. *The road runs through the desert*), as experimentally described by Matlock and Richardson (2004). The analytical tools of the LCM provide fine-grained explanations for compatibility issues of this kind, thereby revealing the explanatory power of the lexical templates in accounting for the semantic motivation of syntactic constructions.

Caused-motion constructions with *order*

Subsumption of the lexical template for *orders* with the caused-motion construction requires the addition of a third argument (*z*) indicating the (intended or expected) end of motion. The resulting event and argument structures for *orders* display this necessary change, while the *qualia* structure remains the same:

Order:

EVENTSTR = [**do'** (x, [**say'** (x,y)]$_{e1}$)]$_{E1}$ [CAUSE [BECOME **be-LOC** (y, z)]$_{e2}$]$_{E2,}$
E1>E2
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = x: animate_ind
FORMAL = human PERM$_2$ LOC $^{SOC\uparrow}{}_2$]
ARG2= y: animate_ind
FORMAL = human LOC $^{SOC\downarrow}{}_1$]
ARG3= *z*: inanimate
FORMAL = location

QUALIASTR = {Q_F: MANNER: Magn$_{e1}$
Q_A: **want'** (x, e_2)
Q_T: e_2: Bon$_x$ Nocer$_y$ }

The new event structure for the predicate *order*, when subsumed into the caused-motion construction, also specifies that the type of activity that the speaker wants the addressee to perform involves motion to a new location, as captured by the element BECOME **be-LOC**. This subsumption process is not arbitrary but motivated by a high-level cognitive process that has grammatical consequences. Note that 'order' does not express caused motion, but simply someone's attempt to manipulate someone else, who is the goal of 'ordering'. Since verbal manipulation can cause self-

instigated motion, using the verb in the caused-motion construction is only possible if we understand the goal element of ordering as if it were the physical object of caused motion. This process, which is metaphorical, licenses the use of *order* with the caused-motion construction.

Resultative constructions with *order*

Consider the case of 'order someone dead', as in (4) below. The protagonist (i.e. the person that issues the order or manipulator) expects the addressee to execute his order in such a way that the addressee's (implicit) action complies with some explicit consequences on someone else (the undergoer of the implicit action). 'Order someone dead' is thus a compressed version of 'order the addressee to act in such a way that, as a result, a third party becomes dead'. The cognitive process that underlies the compressed version is metonymic: the result of the action stands for the action that leads to such a result.

(4)
The Bolivian army *ordered him dead*.

(From < http://lajauretsi.wordpress.com/2008/11/25/benicio-as-che/> Accessed on May 29, 2010)

The same rationale is followed by example (5) below, where 'arrested (for murder)' is the result of the implicit action that someone else is compelled to carry out as desired by the protagonist.

(5)
[...] the District Attorney's office *ordered Barnes arrested* for murder. (From <http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20100524_Barnes_jury_to_resume_deliberations_today.html > Accessed on May 29, 2010)

González-García (2008, 2009) has discussed examples like (2) and (3), on the one hand, and (4) and (5), on the other hand, as cases of the *manipulative subjective-transitive construction*, which is a member of the family of subjective-transitive constructions. The constructions in this family express a high degree of involvement or personal commitment of the subject NP (the protagonist) on the rest of the predication (e.g. *They called me arrogant*, *I like my meat rare*, *She believed him guilty*), but it is only in the manipulative variant that the object of the verb is the undergoer of an action that will have an expected result. In the other members of the subjective-transitive family, the adjective simply expresses either an inherent or an ascribed property of the object.

In our view, the manipulative construction is crucially different from the rest of the members of the subjective-transitive family because of its causal ingredient. In fact, the manipulative construction is a hybrid one, which combines elements of the subjective-transitive family and either the resultative or the caused-motion configurations. From the subjective-transitive family it inherits the feature of the high commitment feature of the protagonist (the manipulator). Since manipulative actions are intended to bring about a result, i.e. they are planned to be causal, it is only natural that the rest of the features (the presence of an undergoer that experiences a change of state) are imported from the resultative or the caused-motion constructions. Note in this respect that the caused-motion construction is essentially resultative in nature, since the destination of motion is the intended result of caused motion.

Another important issue has to do with the possibility to use the verb 'order' with the *object + infinitive* construction, which has been analyzed in detail by Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2010), as illustrated by the following versions of sentences (2) and (5) above:

(2') I instantly *ordered her to go out of* the room.

(5') [...] the District Attorney's office *ordered Barnes to be arrested* for murder.

However, note the impossibility of the following version of (4):

(4') *The Bolivian army *ordered him to be/become dead*.

The question of the difference between the *object + infinitive* and the resultative construction is related to Goldberg's (1995) discussion of the constraints on the use of the caused-motion construction with verbal predicates such as *convince*, *persuade* and *encourage* (but not others like *frighten*, *lure* and *coax*). For example, compare:

(8)
*She convinced/persuaded/encouraged Peter out of the room.

(9)
a. The ghost frightened the boy out of the room.
b. The siren lured the sailor into the rocks.
c. She coaxed him into her room.

Goldberg notes that with *convince*, *persuade* and *encourage* the entity denoted by the direct object makes a cognitive decision that mediates between the causing event and the entailed motion. This is not the case with *frighten*, *lure* and *coax*.

However, as noted by Peña (2009), *convince* verbs are in fact felicitous with the caused-motion construction when motion is used figuratively to express a result, as in *He persuaded me into staying with him*. According to Peña, the reason for this may be that in examples of this kind the cognitive decision has been made in the process of being convinced. This explanation only applies partially to the use of *order* with the resultative and the caused-motion constructions, since the manipulative nature of *order* scarcely allows for a decision to be made. In (2), *I instantly ordered her out of the room*, the speaker's intention is to prevent the receiver of the order from making any decision as to whether to carry out the required action or not. The same holds for cases of figurative motion with *order* expressing result. Compare:

(10)
a. He persuaded me into counseling.
b. He ordered me into counseling.

Order fits this constructional pattern for the same reasons as *frighten*, *coax* or *lure*, which separates this verb off from *convince* verbs. We believe this explanation largely improves on the classical distinction made by Karttunen (1971) between *factive* and *implicative* predicates. Obviously, *persuade* belongs to the former class and *order* to the latter. However, since a factive predicate presupposes the actuality of the result, the *factive/implicative* distinction is unable to account for the possibility of (8a) but not of (6).

In Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2010), Goldberg's and Peña's observations with respect to the use of *convince* predicates have been refined in order to account for an exception to the general constraint postulated by Goldberg (1995). Peña (2009) herself notes that there are attested uses, although fairly marginal, of *convince* verbs with the caused-motion construction, as in *The scent of lemons persuaded her into the right room*. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2010) argue that sentences like this are possible if there are discourse-related mechanisms (whether purely linguistic or contextual) that give prominence to the result. The accuracy of this observation is clearly discerned if we make the resultative element of the sentence above less prominent, which can be easily done by removing the adjective *right*: *#The scent of lemons persuaded her into the room* (but cf. *The scent of lemons persuaded her to go into the room*). This is consistent with the fact that *convince* verbs tend to be focused on the process rather than on the result of the process, except when there are overriding textual or contextual factors, as in the case of the use of *right* in *the right room*, which emphasizes the idea that the protagonist made the correct choice thereby highlighting this part of the construction and rendering the use of *persuade* (a predicate that focuses on the process) compatible with the caused-motion construction (which is result-oriented). In a similar way, in (10a), *He persuaded me into counseling*, where

there is no actual motion but only figurative motion used to convey the result of the process of persuading, the focus is also on the result since the second protagonist actually goes into counseling. This sentence can be compared with *He persuaded me to go into counseling*, where the process is given prominence. *Order* verbs, just like *coax*, *lure* and *frighten*, are neutral as to whether the focus is on the process or the result, which means that they can be used with either a process or a result-oriented constructional configuration: *He coaxed/ordered me (to go) into counseling.*

The *way*-construction with *order*

More interesting is the lack of compatibility of the verbal predicate *order* with the *caused-motion* construction with 'way', especially since this predicate is fully compatible with the more general caused-motion construction. Consider the impossibility of examples (11) and (12), which are reproduced below for convenience:

(11)
*He *ordered his way into* the room.

(12)
*I *ordered my way into* the army.

The caused-motion construction with 'way' is similarly incompatible with other directive speech act predicates:

(13)
*I *requested my way into* the room.

(14)
* I *advised my way into* the room.

(15)
* I *warned my way into* the room.

(16)
* I *suggested my way into* the room.

Nevertheless, interestingly enough, subsumption with the *way*-construction is not blocked in the case of the predicates *beg* and *threaten*:

(17)
I *begged my way into* university.

(18)
[...] the World screaming that it can't afford to put up with another Bush, he has *threatened his way into* dozens of countries around the World. (From <http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread407792/pg1 > Accessed on May 30, 2010)

The fine-grained semantic description of the predicates *beg* and *threaten* in terms of *qualia* allows a systematic comparison with the semantics of the *way*-construction, which reveals the reason for their compatibility.

Consider the lexical templates for the predicates *beg* and *threaten*:

Beg

EVENTSTR = [**do'** (x, [**say'** (x,y)]$_{e1}$)]$_{E1}$ [CAUSE [**do'** (y)]$_{e2}$]$_{E2,}$ E1>E2
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = x: animate_ind
FORMAL = human LOC $^{SOC\uparrow}{}_{2}$]
ARG2= y: animate_ind
FORMAL = human PERM$_1$ LOC $^{SOC\downarrow}{}_{1}$]
ARG3= z: inanimate
FORMAL = location

QUALIASTR = {Q_F: MANNER: Minus$_{e1}$
Q_A: **want'** (x, e_2)
NOT **want'** (y, e_2)
Q_T: e_2: Bon$_x$ Nocer$_y$ }

If compared with the lexical template for *order*, the one for *beg* displays just the opposite relation of social power and status between the first two arguments, so that ARG1 is now in an inferior power position and lacks the capacity of imposing his/her will on ARG2. This lack of power also triggers a further distinction in the *qualia* structure, to the effect that the MANNER in which the causing event should be performed is in a mitigated unimposing fashion, as captured by the lexical function Minus$_{e1.}$ The first argument, however, still retains, just as was the case with *order*, the desire that the caused action e_2 is carried out under the assumption that this will result in a benefit for him/her.

Threaten

EVENTSTR = [**do'** (x, [**say'** (x,y)]$_{e1}$)]$_{E1}$ [CAUSE [**do'** (y)]$_{e2}$]$_{E2,}$ E1>E2
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = x: animate_ind
FORMAL = human Propt(fear, physical threat)$_2$PERM$_2$LOC $^{SOC\uparrow\downarrow}{}_{2}$]
ARG2= y: animate_ind
FORMAL = human LOC $^{SOC\uparrow\downarrow}{}_{1}$]
ARG3= z: inanimate
FORMAL = location

QUALIASTR = {Q_F: MANNER: $Magn_{e1}$
Q_A: **want'** (x, e_2)
[Magn]NOT **want'**(y, e_2)
Q_T: e_2: Bon_x $MagnNocer_y$ }

The lexical template for *threaten* shows that the relative social power of the human arguments involved is not relevant. Nevertheless, ARG1 is still licensed to impose his/her desires on ARG2. This construal originates in the fear or physical threat felt by ARG2. Moreover, as opposed to other directives, the action that the addressee is required to perform is perceived as highly costly/damaging for him (i.e. e_2: $MagnNocer_y$) and consequently, his opposition to conform with the speaker's desire increases (i.e. [Magn]NOT **want'**(y, e_2)). Because one of the purposes of threats is to create a feeling of fear in the addressee, the MANNER in which the causing event should be performed is intensified, as captured by the Formal *Quale* of the *qualia* structure (i.e. MANNER: $Magn_{e1}$), in order to increase its imposing nature.

The fact that the *way*-construction entails that a path is created to effect motion and that such motion occurs despite some kind of difficulty (Goldberg, 1995: 199-205) ties in well with the semantic makeup of *beg* and *threaten*, both of which comprise an inherent difficulty that needs to be overcome: the lack of power of the speaker over the addressee, in the case of *beg*, and the lack of desire of the addressee to carry out the caused action (because of its costly/detrimental nature), in the case of *threat*. Such inherent difficulties explain the fact that both begging and threatening have an imposing nature, which in turn makes them good candidates for subsumption with the *way* construction. In fact, the inherent difficulty associated with this construction is overcome by the forceful nature of these speech acts. In contrast, no relevant difficulty that needs to be overcome is implied in the semantics of *order*, *request*, *advise*, *warn*, and *suggest* above, whose lexical templates would show a more balanced social and power relationship between the actors involved, and either a beneficial or not so extremely costly action to be performed by the addressee. Consequently, given that the way-construction requires the existence of some kind of obstacle or difficulty, either physical or metaphorical, along the path, these predicates turn out to be incompatible with it.

5. Level 3: speech act constructions

The nature of the relationship between speech act verbs and speech act categories has fuelled a wealth of debate from the 1970s to our days. Searle (1979: ix) has traditionally voiced the line of thought that takes this relationship to be rather loose:

Illocutionary acts are, so to speak, natural conceptual kinds, and we should no more suppose that our ordinary language verbs carve the conceptual field of illocutions at its semantic joints than we would suppose that our ordinary language expressions for naming and describing plants and animals correspond exactly to the natural biological kinds.

Sperber and Wilson (1995) go even further in claiming that it is not even necessary to categorize speech acts in order to understand a speaker's illocutionary goals. Thus, in order to interpret a sentence like *Pass the salt* one only needs to categorize this utterance as an instance of telling, which is a higher level explicature, i.e. a higher-level (or abstract) inference that arises directly from the properties of the utterance without the intervention of the context. Further speech act distinctions (e.g. orders, requests, etc.) are understood depending on assumptions regarding e.g. the social power of the speaker, the beneficiary of the resulting state of affairs, etc. If the speaker is more powerful than the hearer and the final state of affairs is beneficial to him/her, *Pass the salt* will then be understood as an order or request. If the hearer is more powerful, however, the same utterance will be interpreted as a request.

In this article, however, we take sides with those theories which support the idea that every language imposes a particular categorization on the speech act universe and that those speech acts for which languages provide names (or speech act verbs in the case under consideration) are especially relevant for their speakers. This stance is maintained by authors such as Hudson (1985) and Wierzbicka (1985, 1987). As argued by Pérez (2001), the fact that we are continually categorizing utterances as specific speech act types is supported by conversations like the following:

(19)
A: There are still several seats in the first rows.
B: Are you *suggesting* that we move over there?
A: No, I was just *telling* you. Don't you think it's weird they are empty? They are the best. Maybe they have been reserved for someone famous. Wouldn't it be exciting to see one of the leading actors in the flesh?

(20)
Father: Now, go up to that lady over there, the one you have just pushed, and *apologize* to her, say: "I'm sorry, madam."

Child: I don't want to.

In (19) the addressee seems to have problems to interpret the speaker's intention. These problems are solved by means of a special repair strategy (Ruiz de Mendoza

and Otal 1997) which requires the explicitation of the intended speech act category. Example (20) supplies further evidence from language acquisition phenomena, where it is not uncommon to find adults teaching children the type of speech act –and its corresponding linguistic realization procedure– that is required by a given situation.

Once the psychological validity of speech act categories has been established we are faced with the task of providing a sound and comprehensive semantic description of them, as represented by speech act verbs from each particular language. Traditionally, speech act categories have been considered in isolation from their corresponding illocutionary verbs. This is only natural when the lexical description of speech act verbs only attended to their illocutionary point, and only very shallowly, if at all, to other relevant pragmatic aspects of their meaning. Consider the definitions for the predicate *order* provided by the *Merriam-Webster* and the *Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary* respectively:

Definitions of order

Merriam-Webster: 2 a: to give an order to; command

Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary:

1 [transitive] to use your position of authority to tell somebody to do something or say that something must happen

-order somebody to do something:

The company was ordered to pay compensation to its former employees.

The officer ordered them to fire.

The *Merriam-Webster* definition of *order* as 'give an order' is circular and its definition as 'command' is inaccurate since it equates this speech act with one of its hyponyms. The definition provided by the *Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary* is more exhaustive, since it contains pragmatic information such as the relative power relationship between the speakers. Still, this definition does not take into account other equally relevant pragmatic aspects of *order*, including the fact that the caused subevent (i.e. the action that the addressee is told to perform) is desirable from the point of view of the speaker. Likewise, it overlooks the fact that such a subevent is perceived as beneficial for the speaker and costly for the addressee. Finally, no mention is made of the 'intense' force which characterizes *order* and which makes them highly incompatible with expressions of verbal mitigation. All these essential pieces of knowledge about *orders* were included in our lexical template, which is reproduced here for convenience:

Order:

EVENTSTR = [**do'** (x, [**say'** (x,y)]$_{e1}$)]$_{E1}$ [CAUSE [**do'** (y)]$_{e2}$]$_{E2,}$ E1>E2
ARGSTR = [ARG1 = x: animate_ind
FORMAL = human PERM$_2$ LOC $^{SOC\uparrow}{}_2$]
ARG2= y: animate_ind
FORMAL = human LOC $^{SOC\downarrow}{}_1$]

QUALIASTR = {Q_F: MANNER: Magn$_{e1}$
Q_A: **want'** (x, e_2)
Q_T: e_2: Bon$_x$ Nocer$_y$ }

Because of the amount and the nature of the information included in them, lexical templates meet the requirements of what Lakoff (1987) has termed *Idealized Cognitive Models* (ICMs). An ICM is a cognitive structure, based on world knowledge, which is idealized for the purpose of understanding and reasoning, and whose function is to represent reality from a certain perspective. As shall be discussed below, the wealth of information included in the event, argument and *qualia* structures of the lexical templates for speech act predicates endows them with a higher explanatory potential than that of previous attempts of illocutionary knowledge formalization in terms of *propositional ICMs* (Pérez Hernández, 2001; Pérez and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2002) or *illocutionary scenarios* (Panther and Thornburg, 1998). Unlike these, lexical templates include syntactically relevant information (i.e. the *Aktionsart* characterization of the predicate together with its subevents, number of arguments, and temporal sequence of events) in their characterization of predicates, which makes it possible to account for their projection onto level-1 argument constructions, as already shown in section 3. Moreover, the exhaustive semantic and pragmatic portrayal of speech act predicates in terms of *qualia* opens up the possibility of making use of the same lexical templates in the explanation of level-4 illocutionary activity without the need of postulating a separate description of illocutionary categories. In the remainder of this section we shall offer a constructional account of *orders* based on the systematic activation of the relevant meaning features included in the corresponding lexical template by means of a limited set of linguistic realization procedures. We shall also see how the nature of illocutionary constructions may range from full codification to high levels of conventionalization. The strength of the present proposal lies in the fact that non-constructional cases of *orders* can be explained as metonymic operations performed upon the semantic information contained in the very same lexical templates. This maximizes the explanatory potential of the LCM lexical templates for speech act predicates, since they turn out to be the foundation upon which level-1 argument constructions, level-3 illocutionary constructions, and non-constructional inferential illocutionary occurrences are based. Let us now illustrate how both construction and inference-based instances of *orders* can be accounted for on the basis of the

information contained in the corresponding lexical template.

Imperative ***order*** constructions

Orders have traditionally been equated with imperatives. Nevertheless, recent collostructional analysis of the imperative mood contradicts such belief.[1] The verbs picked out by collostruction strength (i.e. by the degree of attraction between words and constructions) provide evidence that one of the typical uses of the imperative is to direct attention in a low-imposition fashion (Stefanowitsch and Gries, 2003: 234). These collostructional findings are also compatible with Risselada's (1993) redefinition of the imperative sentence type as simply "that which presents a proposition for realization."[2] The fact that the imperative is not an exclusive realization procedure for *orders*, but that it can rather express a wide range of directive acts is confirmed by everyday life instances of directives such as those listed below:

(21)
"Be careful with that," he warned me. "It's an aphrodisiac..." (From <http://www.cannabisculture.com/v2/node/23378> Accessed on May 31, 2010).

(22)
"Let go," he advised me, and I loosened my grip on his hands. "No, not of me," he said, smiling. (From <http://www.goodreads.com/book/quotes/140082.Club_Dead> (Accessed on May 31, 2010).

(23)
"Stop please," I requested and Sharad promptly put the brakes on. (From <http://avinashjee.sulekha.com/blog/post/2009/05/tales-from-the-indian-wild-20-hoopoe.htm> (Accessed on May 31, 2010).

(24)
"Give me your money!" he threatened, "or I will blow out your brains." (From <http://www.energyenhancement.org/kabir/Kabir-The-Fish-in-the-Sea-is-Not-Thirsty-Chapter-9-In-Search-of-the-Miraculous-Question-7.html> Accessed on May 31, 2010).

[1] Collostructional analysis is geared to investigating the interaction of lexemes and the grammatical constructions associated with them. As Stefanowitsch and Gries (2003: 209) point out, this method increases "the adequacy of grammatical description by providing an objective way of identifying the meaning of a grammatical construction and determining the degree to which particular slots in it prefer or are restricted to a particular set of lexemes."

[2] This definition is based on a weaker version of the literal force hypothesis (see Pérez 2001).

(25)
"Please give my beak back," he begged Wolf. Wolf just shrugged his shoulders and covered his ears. "Please Bear," he begged.

(From <http://www.tlicho.ca/gonaowo/ourstories/how_raven_lost_his_beak> (Accessed on May 31, 2010).

As argued in Pérez Hernández (2001), the imperative is a largely unspecified linguistic realization procedure compatible with the whole range of directive speech acts. As a matter of fact, without the presence of other more specific realization procedures, the interpretation of an imperative as an *order* necessarily involves some inferential activity. In this connection, Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007) have argued that such inferential activity is guided by generic propositional models such as the *Cost-Benefit ICM*, which captures all the relevant information from high-level illocutionary scenarios associated with all speech act categories. The *Cost-Benefit ICM* consists of eleven conventions, which generalize over specific characteristics of different kinds of illocutionary scenarios. Here we reproduce only those which are relevant for the interpretation of directive speech acts:

The Cost-Benefit ICM

(a) If it is manifest to A that a particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B, and if A has the capacity to change that state of affairs, then A should do so.

(b) If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is not beneficial to B, than A is not expected to bring it about.

(c) If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is beneficial to B, then A is expected to bring it about provided he has the capacity to do so.

(d) If it is manifest to A that it is not manifest to B that a potential state of affairs is (regarded as) beneficial for A, A is expected to make this manifest to B.

(e) If it is manifest to A that it is not manifest to B that a potential state of affairs is beneficial to B, A is expected to make this manifest to B.

(Speaker=B/Hearer=A)

Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007: 117) rightly point out that convention (a) of the *Cost-Benefit ICM* underlies the interpretation of directive acts like *Can you give it back to me?* or *Give it back to me*. Both utterances make manifest that there

is a state of affairs that is not beneficial to the speaker. Consequently, the addressee is prompted to change it and to give the object back to the speaker, if he wants to comply with social expectations. The *Cost-Benefit ICM*, therefore, straightforwardly guides the addressee's interpretation of these utterances towards that of a directive illocution (i.e. that which presents a proposition for realization). It is clear, however, that there is much more involved in the interpretation of such utterances. For example, upon hearing *Can you give it back to me?*, the addressee feels that he is free to decide whether to carry out the requested state of affairs or not. *Give it back to me*, however, communicates a lower degree of optionality. The lack of mitigation of the imperative, as opposed to the inherently polite nature of the interrogative sentence, also leads the addressee to consider the relationship of power that holds with the speaker. If the addressee happens to be more powerful than the speaker, the lack of optionality communicated by the imperative will automatically be cancelled out. In sum, considerations of social power, mitigation, cost-benefit, etc., which exceed the explanatory potential of the Cost-Benefit ICM, are essential to reach the correct interpretation of an utterance. These and other aspects of the semantic/pragmatic make-up of illocutionary categories are part of the lexical templates of speech act predicates described in section 3. We contend that it is the knowledge contained in the semantic module of those lexical templates that guides and facilitates the speaker's inferential activity when faced with linguistically underspecified instances of speech acts. Thus, upon hearing *Give it back to me*, by virtue of convention (a) of the *Cost-Benefit ICM*, the addressee will automatically understand it as a cue for him to carry out a certain action. But in order to assess the degree of imposition of the utterance, he will have to resort to his knowledge about particular types of directives (knowledge which in the LCM has already been shown to find an economic and elegant formalization in the corresponding lexical templates). By way of illustration, the lexical template for *order* makes available relevant pieces of information such as the fact that a superior social power of the speaker correlates with the lack of optionality on the part of the addressee, as well as with an unmitigated expression of the speech act. In those cases in which these features of *orders* are realized either linguistically (i.e. through a sheer imperative) and/or contextually, the utterance will be interpreted as an *order*. It should also be taken into account that the semantico-pragmatic features included in the lexical templates for each speech act type are not equally central to their characterization. In the case of *orders* the power relationship between the speakers is more essential in distinguishing them from other directives than other features such as lack of mitigation, which is but a consequence of the former. Thus, in the example under consideration (*Give it back to me*), if the context reveals that it is the addressee who is higher in the social power scale, then the lack of mitigation of the utterance on its own will not be enough to yield an *order* interpretation. On the contrary, it will probably be taken as an impolite *request*.

The semantic and pragmatic characterization of *orders* included in its lexical template not only aids and guides the interpretation of isolated imperatives as shown in the above discussion, but it also sets the foundations for more conventionalized forms of *orders*.

Of the over 200 occurrences of imperatives retrieved through a *WebCorp* search for this study, only ten appear as sheer imperatives (Imperative verb + complement). The vast majority of them, however, were used in combination with other realization procedures, thus giving way to more concrete subtypes of directive constructions (i.e. orders, requests, suggestions, etc.).[3] The examples in (19-23) above are paradigm cases which illustrate some general tendencies that arise from our corpus data. Thus, imperatives involved in the expression of *threats* are usually followed by a disjunctive clause stating a potential negative scenario for the addressee in case he fails to carry out the proposed action. Those conveying a *warning* generally include an explanation or justification for the proposed action expressed by means of a subsequent declarative sentence. Explicit *requests* making use of the imperative mood add some kind of mitigating device (i.e. the adverb *please*, a tagged question, etc.). Cases of *begging* function very much like *requests*, except for the fact that they intensify the expression of politeness and minimize imposition by means of the repetition of mitigation expressions. It should be further noted that each of these realization procedures often realizes one of the most central and definitional semantic features of the speech act category under consideration. In other words, we contend that a constructional account of illocution is possible if the semantic and pragmatic make-up of speech acts is clearly and systematically formalized (e.g. through lexical templates) and if the analysis of their linguistic realization is extended beyond the lexical and syntactic realms to make it to include the morphological, intonational and discursive aspects of linguistic expression.

As far as the speech act of ordering is concerned, we summarize below the semantic features that characterize it as captured by the corresponding lexical template. This analysis will allow us to identify the realization procedures for this speech act:

Semantic make-up of orders:

-The speaker's utterance causes the addressee to perform an action:

[3] Realization procedures, as understood in our account (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal 1997; Pérez 2001), are of a broad nature, referring to any aspect of linguistic description (intonational, morphological, syntactic, discursive) which may be used to activate the semantic/pragmatic variables that define a given speech act.

EVENTSTR = **[do'** (x, **[say'** (x,y)]$_{e1}$)]$_{E1}$ [CAUSE **[do'** (y)]$_{e2}$]$_{E2,}$ E1>E2

-The speaker is in a superior social and power position and is thus licensed to impose his wishes on the addressee:

ARGSTR = [ARG1 = x: animate_ind
FORMAL = human PERM$_2$ LOC $^{SOC\uparrow}{}_2$]
ARG2 = y: animate_ind
FORMAL = human LOC $^{SOC\downarrow}{}_1$]

- The speaker's power licenses him to maximize the force and harshness of his speech act:

QUALIASTR = Q_F: MANNER: Magn$_{e1}$

-The speaker wants the caused subevent to take place

QUALIASTR = Q_A: **want'** (x, e_2)

-The caused subevent is understood as beneficial/desirable for the speaker and costly for the addressee:

QUALIASTR =Q_T: e_2: Bon$_x$ Nocer$_y$

Let us now turn to the description of those realization procedures which, by expressing one or more of these semantic features, may turn imperatives into more or fully explicit instances of *orders*. Consider the following examples:

(26)
"In fact, I **order** you to stop reading my blog. That's a direct order. Stop. Now. Go away. Nothing to see here." (From <http://sites.google.com/site/steveyegge2/you-should-write-blogs > Accessed on June 2, 2010).

(27)
"**Take off** your pants, **kid**," he ordered. (From < http://www.amazon.com/Secret-Services-Beau-Erotica-ebook/dp/B003MW060W> Accessed on June, 3, 2010).

(28)
"**Private** Halter, **step forward!** Know anything about doctorin'?" (From <http://deathdisciples.com/reg//displayimage.php?album=6&pos=3> (Accessed on June 4, 2010).

(29)

"Bring Xigbar to me **at once**, Marluxius!" he ordered. "Of course, Superior." I said.

(From < http://www.fanpop.com/spots/kingdom-hearts/articles/18923/title/marluxias-down-time-part-4> Accessed on June, 3, 2010)

(30)
"Upload scans **now**." Sam ordered.

(From < http://bmgf.bulbagarden.net/showthread.php?p=1706811> Accessed on June 2, 2010).

(31)
"Come as you are, **straight away**," he ordered, and with my braces hanging about me, I went into the midst of the officers.

(From < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Henry_Hook> (Accessed on June 2, 2010).

(32)
"Get half your platoon to Manah **right away,**" he ordered. (From http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002110336_tillman06.html (Accessed on June 3, 2010).

Example (26) represents a fully codified *order* construction. The verb *order*, used as a performative predicate, has lexicalized all the semantic features that define this type of speech act, thus yielding a fully explicit order. In turn, examples (27) and (28) represent highly conventionalized *order* constructions of the type:

Imperative + vocative expressing speaker's superiority

By making explicit the power of the speaker over the addressee through the use of vocatives such as *kid* and *private*, this construction metonymically activates the central defining feature of *orders* and, in turn, blocks the interpretation of those utterances as other directive speech acts (i.e. *requesting, begging, suggesting, advising, warning*) whose semantic characterization does not include such considerations of social power. The expression of the speaker's superiority over the addressee also blocks the interpretation of these examples as other types of imposing directives such as *threats*, since this type of illocutionary act is only called for precisely in those scenarios where the speaker does not have enough authority over the addressee and needs, therefore, to use other coercive methods of force. A strong contextual

parametrization could, of course, turn (27) and (28) into instances of *threats*. Imagine, for instance, that the speaker is pointing a gun at the addressee while uttering those expressions. This is not, however, the default interpretation of these examples and it does not rule out their description as *order* constructions. As a matter of fact, as shown in Pérez (2001: ch.10) constructions for the act of *threatening* are characterized by the addition of a disjunctive clause (or the use of an alternative If-clause construction) stating some kind of negative consequence for the addressee in case he does not comply with the speaker's request for action (e.g. Give it to me or *I'll kill you; If you don't give it to me, I'll kill you*).

Examples (29) to (32) are still highly conventionalized order constructions. Their cognitive cost however is slightly higher than that of the previous examples, since they involve an additional metonymic mapping in their interpretation. In examples (27) and (28), the specific nature of the vocatives straightforwardly communicates the authority of the speaker, thus metonymically leading to the 'order' reading. In the utterances under consideration, however, this is done in a more indirect fashion. Thus, the speaker's superiority itself is communicated metonymically by using expressions of immediateness (i.e. *at once, now, right away, straightaway*, etc.), which require a powerful agent. As was the case with the vocatives in (27) and (28), these expressions of immediateness are incompatible with most other directives (i.e. *requesting, suggesting, begging, advising, warning*). As far as their use as *threats* is concerned, strong contextual parametrization would still be needed as was the case for (27) and (28). It is safe, therefore, to regard expressions of this kind as order constructions of the type:

Imperative + expression of immediateness

Needless to say that the combination of the two realization procedures seen so far (i.e. vocatives and adverbs of immediateness) would result in even more forceful instances of ordering:

(33)
Private Halter, step forward! Now!

Declarative order constructions

Declarative sentences represent a little specialized procedure for the expression of orders. Nevertheless, further specifications of the form of a declarative sentence through grammatical, lexical, and/or suprasegmental means may yield order constructions with a level of effectiveness similar to that of imperative order

constructions. The following examples illustrate some of the most common:

(34)
"You **are to stand** in the vestibule here," he ordered. "When Sergeant Heath and his men come, bring them to us at once"

(From <http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200361h.html> Accessed on June 4, 2010).

(35)
"You **are going to** hospital **right now**," he ordered, scooping up Josh.

(From <http://www.weloveyourstories.co.uk/Sold-stories/May-2010/Allergic-to-my-boots.aspx> Accessed on June, 4, 2010).

(36)
"**I want you to** rest," Godric ordered Liam. He held up a hand as his son frowned. (From <http://goodystuff.blogspot.com/> Accessed on June 4, 2010).

(37)
Dair, **you've got to take** that ledge," he ordered, nodding towards the top of a spur.

(From <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-454305/Was-Colonel-H-mad-fool-Part-2.html> Accessed on June 4, 2010).

(38)
"You **must** confess," he ordered me. (From <http://www.jstor.org/pss/4228870> (Accessed on June 4, 2010).

Declarative-To be to constructions, such as the one in (34), are too impositive to function as *requests* (**You are to stand in the vestibule, please*), *suggestions* (**We are to go to the cinema*) and *begging* (**Please Oh please, You are to wait for me*), and at the same time not insistent/coercive enough to work well as or *threats* (**You are to give that to me, or I'll kill you*). On the contrary, they are perfectly compatible with the semantic make-up of *orders*, according to which the speaker's authority is enough to license an imposition on the addressee.

Order constructions of the *Declarative- going to + expressions of immediateness* type function in much the same way as their corresponding *Imperative + expression of immediateness* counterparts. They metonymically activate the speaker's power

variable, thus realizing one of the most central features of *orders* and guiding the addressee to this interpretation, as is the case with example (35).

Declarative sentences of the *I want you to do something* type, such as the one illustrated by example (36), activate the variable related to the speaker's desire that the proposed action is carried out. Utterances of this type exploit part (c) of the Cost-Benefit ICM, putting the addressee under the social obligation of complying with the speaker's wish. Such a direct statement of the speaker's desire is not compatible, however, with acts which take for granted a high degree of optionality/freedom on the part of the addressee to decide upon his future course of action (e.g. requesting, begging, advising, warning, etc.), since ignoring such an explicit expression of the speaker's wish would result in a social breach. Besides, no one would express his/her wants in such an open fashion without the authority to ensure that his/her wishes may be granted. The risk of losing face would otherwise be too high. In addition, since utterances of this kind do not make such authority explicit, but rather expect the addressee to infer its existence on the basis of his knowledge of the workings of social interaction (Cost-Benefit ICM), they are not impositive enough to work well as highly coercive speech acts like *threats*. They are, on the contrary, a good vehicle for the expression of orders.

Finally, *Declarative + deontic objective mood operators* (*have to/must*)[4] constructions are found to activate the power variable of orders in an indirect metonymic fashion, focusing on the expected outcome of the act: the addressee finds himself under the obligation to carry out the action proposed by the speaker (authority). Deontic operators expressing strong obligation are also found in the expression of *advising* and *warning*, but they either instantiate peripheral cases of these categories, or are accompanied by other linguistic elements which conveniently mitigate their force. In this way, they lose their impositive character and become compatible with those acts (see Pérez Hernández 2001: chs. 6 and 7). Consider the following examples:

(39)
Rice varies as to how much liquid it absorbs- you **may have to** add a little more stock or water during cooking. (From *Good Housekeeping*. February 1998: 135. Example taken from Pérez (2001: 174).

[4] In the ensuing discussion we borrow the terms *operator* and *satellite* from classical Functional Grammar or FG (see Dik 1989, 1997). In FG predications are fully specified through the addition of layers of operators and/or satellites. The function of operators and satellites is essentially the same and it generally coincides with the function traditionally ascribed to adjuncts. However, in FG operators are grammatical devices whereas satellites are of a lexical nature. Deontic operators express obligation.

(40)
"**You've got to** see it and experience it in the real world **to learn**," he advised. (From <http://dalnews.dal.ca/2010/02/17/lord_dal.html>Accessed on June 9, 2010).

(41)
"You **have to** get here early **if** you want to get a good spot," he advised. (From <http://www.projo.com/ri/northsmithfield/content/projo_2002_drivein825.54d4349d.html> Accessed on June 9, 2010).

(42)
"**I think you've got to** be very careful not to swallow an alarmist lie into relation to the term yardie or indeed to make any exaggerated statements about their impact on crime in Britain," he warned. "**We don't know the extent of imported Jamaican crime is the true reason**." (From the *British National Corpus* (BNC). Example taken from Pérez (2001: 201).

(43)
And he warned: "There **will have to** be work done at Crowtree to bring it up to Premier League standard –showers, facilities and some other things." (From the *British National Corpus* (BNC). Example taken from Pérez (2001: 201).

(44)
Taylor warned: "We **have to** be careful of Norway. **They have strung together some good results recently and on the same night they beat Italy 2-1**…" (From the *British National Corpus* (BNC). Example taken from Pérez (2001: 202).

The expression of *advising* can be carried out by means of mood operators of obligation such as *have to* and *must*. Nevertheless, as illustrated by examples (39) to (41), such operators are conveniently mitigated so as to block their interpretation as impositive speech acts (e.g. *orders*, *threats*). In example (39) such mitigation is performed through an interesting interplay between deontic and epistemic modality. As pointed out in Pérez Hernández(2001: 174), "the obligatoriness of the deontic operator expressed by *have to* is mitigated by means of the use of the preceding epistemic mood operator *may*, which indicates lack of certainty. In this way the impositive nature of *have to* is softened, the force of the act is mitigated, and the advice reading is not only possible, but also preferred to the interpretation of the utterance as an order." In turn, examples (40) and (41) show how the coercive nature of *have to* can also be softened through the use of satellites of purpose (i.e. *to learn; if you want to get a good spot*). These indicate the benefit that the addressee will obtain by performing the proposed action, thus activating one of the main semantic features

of *advising*.

Examples (42) to (44) illustrate how the use of impositive mood operators in the expression of *warnings* is also accompanied by mitigating devices such as the use of reason satellites, the passive voice, and/or mood operators. In (42), the mitigating effect is achieved by means of an expression of uncertainty (i.e. *I think*) and a discourse satellite of reason (i.e. *We don't know the extent…*). In example (43) we find a level 2 deontic objective mood operator (i.e. *will have to*) whose impositive force is mitigated by means of a passive construction (i.e. *There will have to be work done…*) and a satellite of purpose (i.e. *to bring it up to Premier League…*). Finally, in (44) the second person plural subject and the discourse satellite of reason (i.e. *They have strung together…*) are enough to soften the coercive nature of the mood operator and thus make it compatible with a *warning* reading.

Interrogative order constructions

Our search has not yielded any example of orders constructed on the basis of interrogative configurations. This should come as no surprise since the inherent openness of interrogative sentences grants the addressee with a level of freedom of action incompatible with the forceful nature of orders.

5. Conclusions

The present article is a first step towards laying the foundations for the development of the illocutionary component of the LCM. The LCM contemplates the possibility of combing inferential and non-inferential meaning construction activity in all of its descriptive levels. In dealing with speech act meaning, the LCM has so far proposed the following meaning construction mechanisms: (i) cued inferencing based on the metonymic access of high-level cognitive models, such as the Cost-Benefit ICM postulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007); such models are obtained by generalizing over relevant aspects of speech act scenarios like those proposed by Panther and Thornburg (1998), later revisited by Pérez and Ruiz de Mendoza (2002); (ii) illocutionary constructions, such as *Can You X, please?* for requests, which are largely idiomatic (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, 2008a); these are level-3 constructs; (iii) level-1 lexical descriptions, which are the equivalent of classical performative predicates (see Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez 2010); (iv) level-1 argument structure constructions, like the manipulative subjective-transitive construction (e.g. *I want you out by lunchtime*) studied in Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez (2010). It must be borne in mind that basic speech act meaning obtained through level-1 lexical and constructional mechanisms may be overridden at level

3 through cued inferencing operations. For example, *I order you to stay!* is not an order if the addressee has asked the speaker for permission to stay; it is rather a way of reassuring the addressee that the speaker is more than willing to allow him to stay. In much the same way, *I want you in my life* is not manipulative if the speaker is aware that the addressee desires to share her life with the speaker.

The explanatory power of these proposals is high since it makes use of the two general cognitive mechanisms that are operational at other levels of the LCM: cued inferencing and subsumption. The pervasive use of these two mechanisms in the LCM is a consequence of the equipollence hypothesis, according to which it is necessary for the researcher to investigate if, or to what extent, processes that are operational at one level or area of enquiry are also operational elsewhere. In the present article, we have applied this hypothesis in order to improve the overall elegance of the LCM by exploring in what way the elements of level-3 illocutionary scenarios can be made part of level-1 lexical structure. In order to achieve this added degree of elegance, we have enriched the description of lexical templates for speech act predicates (e.g. *order*, *beg*, *threaten*) on the basis of Pustejovsky's notion of *qualia* structure. In so doing, we have been able to show that such descriptions allow the analyst to account for the constraining factors on the syntactic behavior of speech act predicates in terms of level-1 lexical-constructional subsumption processes (e.g. the use of a speech act predicate in the caused-motion construction). This account has also allowed us to explore complementary ways of producing conventional speech act meaning through the use of other level-1 lexical and constructional resources of a semi-idiomatic nature such as the *to be to* construction for ordering and the constructional configuration *You Are Going To* X plus expressions of immediateness. The resulting account makes explicit links between lexical structure and level-3 cognitive modeling (i.e. high-level situational cognitive models). It also enhances the role of non-inferential linguistic devices in conveying illocutionary meaning and distributes conventional speech act meaning between levels 1 and level 3 of the LCM, while inferred illocution remains at level 3. This enhanced role of lexical and constructional devices, which is in keeping with the work carried out within recent work within Construction Grammar (Boas 2008, 2009), is supported by the analysis of real data.

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